關(guān)于中美貿(mào)易沖突，你應(yīng)該知道的五個(gè)問(wèn)題

In the first year of the Trump administration, the president’s threats to upend the global trade system seemed like mostly bluster — lots of threats, not much action.

在特朗普政府執(zhí)政的第一年里，總統(tǒng)要顛覆全球貿(mào)易體系的威脅似乎大都是虛張聲勢(shì)——雷聲大雨點(diǎn)小。

Not anymore.

不再如此。

The administration moved forward Friday with a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of Chinese imports. In recent weeks, it imposed taxes on imported steel and aluminum, including that from close allies like the European Union and Canada. And those actions both follow earlier measures on washing machines and solar panels.

特朗普政府周五宣布，對(duì)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的價(jià)值500億美元的產(chǎn)品加征25%的關(guān)稅。政府在最近幾周對(duì)進(jìn)口鋼材和鋁材加征了關(guān)稅，包括來(lái)自歐盟和加拿大等親密盟友的鋼材和鋁材。這些行動(dòng)是在早些時(shí)候?qū)ο匆聶C(jī)和太陽(yáng)能電池板加征關(guān)稅之后采取的。

All of which prompts some important questions: Is the United States engaged in what should be classified as a trade war? And what are the economic consequences likely to be?

所有這一切引發(fā)了一些重要的問(wèn)題：美國(guó)是否卷入了一場(chǎng)應(yīng)該被歸類(lèi)為貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的沖突?其經(jīng)濟(jì)后果可能會(huì)怎樣?

Is this a trade war?

這是一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)嗎?

Definitely maybe.

絕對(duì)可能是。

A “trade war” refers to measures and countermeasures on import restriction that escalate over time, causing trade between two countries to break down.

“貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)”是指國(guó)家之間對(duì)進(jìn)口商品不斷升級(jí)的限制和反制，導(dǎo)致兩國(guó)之間的貿(mào)易崩潰。

But there is no specific definition. Everyone would agree that the Depression-era period of escalating tariffs was a trade war. Everyone would agree that, say, George W. Bush’s 2002 steel tariffs and the retaliation by Europe was not. But the exact line between trade skirmish and trade war is subjective.

但貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)并沒(méi)有具體的定義。所有人都會(huì)同意，大蕭條時(shí)期不斷提高的關(guān)稅是一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。每個(gè)人都會(huì)同意，比如喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)2002年對(duì)鋼鐵征收的關(guān)稅、以及歐洲的報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)不是貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。但貿(mào)易沖突和貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)之間的確切界線沒(méi)有客觀的定義。

“Yes, we are now in a trade war,” said Mary Lovely, an economist at Syracuse who studies trade. She emphasizes two factors. First, the Trump administration is signaling that it will meet Chinese retaliation with further retaliation, and second, “the two sides are no longer engaged in productive talks to defuse tensions.”

“是的，我們現(xiàn)在正在一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，”研究貿(mào)易的雪城大學(xué)(Syracuse)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家瑪麗·絡(luò)蕪里(Mary Lovely)說(shuō)。她強(qiáng)調(diào)了兩個(gè)因素。第一，特朗普政府已發(fā)出信號(hào)，它將對(duì)中國(guó)的報(bào)復(fù)措施采取進(jìn)一步的報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)。第二，“雙方已不再為緩和緊張局勢(shì)進(jìn)行有效益的談判。”

Chad Bown, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is more cautious. Is this a trade war? “In my view not yet,” he said. “My view of a trade war is when all countries start responding unilaterally, and without respect to international rules in terms of the levels of tariff retaliation that they engage in.”

彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)高級(jí)研究員乍得·鮑恩(Chad Bown)則持更謹(jǐn)慎的態(tài)度。這是一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)嗎?“在我看來(lái)還不是，”他說(shuō)。“我對(duì)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的看法是，所有的國(guó)家都開(kāi)始單方面地做出反應(yīng)，而且在所采取的報(bào)復(fù)關(guān)稅水平上，它們都不遵守國(guó)際規(guī)則。”

So far, China, the European Union and other trading partners have responded within the confines of World Trade Organization rules.

到目前為止，中國(guó)、歐盟，以及美國(guó)的其他貿(mào)易伙伴作出的反應(yīng)都是在世界貿(mào)易組織規(guī)定的范圍內(nèi)。

What’s the logic behind the administration’s action?

是什么邏輯在支配特朗普政府的行動(dòng)?

For many years, American companies have complained of being treated shabbily as they try to do business in China. They often must partner with Chinese companies to be allowed to do business in the country, and frequently complain that their most advanced technologies are being stolen, among other concerns.

多年來(lái)，美國(guó)公司一直抱怨在中國(guó)做生意時(shí)受到不公正的對(duì)待。它們通常必須與中國(guó)企業(yè)合資，才能獲得在中國(guó)做生意的許可，美國(guó)公司還經(jīng)常抱怨，它們最先進(jìn)的技術(shù)正在被竊走等等。

The Trump administration’s list of goods to be subjected to the tariffs is aimed at these high-tech sectors, including aerospace, telecommunications equipment and robotics.

特朗普政府將加征關(guān)稅的產(chǎn)品清單針對(duì)的是包括航天、電信和機(jī)器人在內(nèi)的高技術(shù)行業(yè)。

China has said it will place tariffs on $50 billion worth of American imports in retaliation. That’s where things get interesting. The Trump administration is threatening to escalate things further if China retaliates, pulling another $100 billion of goods into the mix. This increases the possibility that the dispute will spiral to encompass ever larger swaths of goods.

中國(guó)表示將對(duì)價(jià)值500億美元的美國(guó)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品征收?qǐng)?bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅。事情在這里變得有意思了。特朗普政府威脅說(shuō)，如果中國(guó)采取報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)的話，將讓事態(tài)進(jìn)一步升級(jí)，政府已將價(jià)值1000億美元的更多商品納入可能加征關(guān)稅的行列。這就增加了糾紛不斷升級(jí)、把越來(lái)越多的商品包括進(jìn)來(lái)的可能性。

Will it work?

會(huì)奏效嗎?

China views development of its high-tech industries as core to its economic strategy of the future and won’t want to give up advantages in those sectors lightly. On the other hand, the substantial U.S. trade deficit with China means the American side has more potential Chinese imports on which to slap punitive tariffs than the Chinese do, a potential source of leverage.

中國(guó)把發(fā)展高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)作為未來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)略的核心，不會(huì)輕易放棄這些領(lǐng)域的優(yōu)勢(shì)。另一方面，美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的巨額貿(mào)易逆差意味著，美國(guó)有更多對(duì)之征收懲罰性關(guān)稅的潛在中國(guó)進(jìn)口，比中國(guó)能進(jìn)行反制的多，這是美方砝碼的一個(gè)潛在來(lái)源。

The Trump administration’s negotiating strategy has been erratic. At one point last month, there seemed to be progress toward an accord in which China would buy more American agriculture and energy products. That would have helped reduce the United States’ trade deficit with China, one of the president’s major goals. But it wouldn’t have done much of anything about the longer-term issues around technology theft, and those talks fell apart.

特朗普政府的談判策略一直不穩(wěn)定。上月的某個(gè)時(shí)候，美國(guó)似乎在與中國(guó)達(dá)成協(xié)議方面取得了進(jìn)展，中國(guó)將購(gòu)買(mǎi)更多的美國(guó)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品和能源產(chǎn)品。那將有助于減少美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)的貿(mào)易逆差，減少逆差是特朗普總統(tǒng)的主要目標(biāo)之一。但那沒(méi)有解決多少圍繞著技術(shù)盜竊的長(zhǎng)期問(wèn)題，所以那些談判破裂了。

The United States might have a stronger negotiating position if it were joined by allies like Canada, Japan and the European Union. But given the steel and aluminum tariffs and tensions with Canada, the United States finds itself on its own in talks with China.

如果加拿大、日本和歐盟等盟友加入進(jìn)來(lái)的話，美國(guó)的談判立場(chǎng)可能會(huì)更強(qiáng)。但考慮到美國(guó)對(duì)鋼鐵和鋁加征關(guān)稅、與加拿大緊張關(guān)系，它在與中國(guó)的談判中只能孤身作戰(zhàn)了。

Is this going to crash the U.S. economy?

這會(huì)讓美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰嗎?

Probably not.

可能不會(huì)。

The United States has gross domestic product of nearly $20 trillion, so a new tax on $50 billion (or, eventually, $150 billion or more) of Chinese imports is a rounding error. Even when you count the costs of steel and aluminum and other tariffs that have resulted from the president’s aggressive trade, it’s hard to get to numbers that move the dial much on overall growth.

美國(guó)的國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)接近20萬(wàn)億美元，因此對(duì)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口的價(jià)值500億美元(最終或許達(dá)到1500億美元或更多)的產(chǎn)品征收新稅可以略而不記。即使你把特朗普聲勢(shì)浩大的貿(mào)易攻勢(shì)中所有的鋼鐵、鋁和其他關(guān)稅的代價(jià)計(jì)算進(jìn)來(lái)，也很難達(dá)到能在較大程度上影響整體經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的數(shù)字。

As countries retaliate, they can certainly cause damage for individual American industries that export, but the reality is most of the economic activity in the United States is for domestic consumption. Exports constitute about 12 percent of G.D.P.

隨著其他國(guó)家采取報(bào)復(fù)行動(dòng)，它們肯定會(huì)對(duì)從事出口的個(gè)別美國(guó)行業(yè)造成損害，但現(xiàn)實(shí)情況是，美國(guó)的大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)都是針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)消費(fèi)進(jìn)行的。出口只占GDP的12%左右。

That’s not to play down the potentially heavy damage in the industries caught in the middle. Soybean futures prices fell Friday, as commodities traders predicted China would buy fewer soybeans in retaliation. Some major industries that use steel and aluminum are complaining of sharply higher prices, which in turn makes them less competitive against global competitors.

這不是要淡化對(duì)那些卷入貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端的行業(yè)可能帶來(lái)的嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。上周五，由于大宗商品交易商預(yù)測(cè)，作為報(bào)復(fù)，中國(guó)將減少購(gòu)買(mǎi)美國(guó)大豆，大豆期貨價(jià)格下跌。一些使用鋼鐵和鋁的主要行業(yè)正在抱怨原材料價(jià)格大幅上漲，這繼而會(huì)降低它們?cè)谌蚋?jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手面前的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

“The questions are does this escalate from here, is this part of a much bigger process, and how do business confidence and financial markets respond?” said Lewis Alexander, chief U.S. economist at Nomura. “With these relatively modest first-round things, it’s hard to make the case that it’s material” to the overall economy.

“問(wèn)題是，將從這里升級(jí)嗎?這是一個(gè)更大過(guò)程的一部分嗎?商業(yè)信心和金融市場(chǎng)將如何反應(yīng)呢?”野村證券首席美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家劉易斯·亞歷山大(Lewis Alexander)說(shuō)。“只是這些相對(duì)溫和的首輪戰(zhàn)火，很難說(shuō)對(duì)(整體經(jīng)濟(jì))有實(shí)質(zhì)性影響。”

The risk comes if things spiral out of control in ways that crater the stock market or lead businesses to pull back significantly on their investment spending. Keep in mind the way that trade disputes can cause economic damage without triggering a recession. Gary Cohn, the former White House economic adviser, said this week that tariffs could wipe out economic gains from the tax cut passed late last year. Still, with the economy in relatively strong shape, there is a big difference between “not growing as fast as it would without a trade war” and outright recession.

如果發(fā)生導(dǎo)致股市崩盤(pán)、或?qū)е缕髽I(yè)大幅削減投資支出的事態(tài)失控的話，會(huì)產(chǎn)生風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。請(qǐng)記住貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端可能造成經(jīng)濟(jì)損失、但不引發(fā)衰退的方式。前白宮經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)加里·科恩(Gary Cohn)本周說(shuō)，關(guān)稅可能會(huì)抵消去年底通過(guò)的減稅法案帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)好處。盡管如此，由于經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況相對(duì)很好，“增長(zhǎng)比在沒(méi)有貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的情況下緩慢”與經(jīng)濟(jì)徹底衰退之間有很大的差別。

Will this mean higher prices?

這將意味著更高的價(jià)格嗎?

The initial tariffs on Chinese goods are not focused on consumer products. They are to be levied on products mainly purchased by businesses, such as industrial equipment. That could mean upward pressure on inflation eventually, but in subtle ways.

首批加征關(guān)稅的中國(guó)產(chǎn)品并不針對(duì)消費(fèi)品。這些關(guān)稅是對(duì)主要由企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)的產(chǎn)品征收的，比如工業(yè)設(shè)備。這可能意味著最終會(huì)有讓通貨膨脹上行的壓力，但是以一種微妙的方式。

Even if the dispute spreads to consumer goods, the actual amount American consumers will pay depends on many factors, including the availability of domestic substitutes and the competitiveness of the industry. For any given product, it is hard to predict how much of a 25 percent tariff will be passed through to consumers versus absorbed by producers and retailers.

即使?fàn)幎藬U(kuò)大到消費(fèi)品，美國(guó)消費(fèi)者實(shí)際要掏出的錢(qián)取決于許多因素，包括國(guó)內(nèi)替代品的供應(yīng)和那個(gè)行業(yè)中有多少競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。對(duì)任何給定產(chǎn)品來(lái)說(shuō)，很難預(yù)測(cè)加征的25%的關(guān)稅中將有多少會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)嫁到消費(fèi)者身上，而不是被生產(chǎn)商和零售商吸收。

Still, consumers ultimately pay the bill for trade barriers in one way or another. At the start of the year, the administration put a 20 percent tariff on imported washing machines; the price of laundry equipment is up 17 percent since then.

盡管如此，消費(fèi)者最終還是會(huì)以某種方式為貿(mào)易壁壘買(mǎi)單的。今年初，政府對(duì)進(jìn)口洗衣機(jī)加征了20%的關(guān)稅;洗衣設(shè)備的價(jià)格在那之后已經(jīng)上漲了17%。