“文金會(huì)”落幕，現(xiàn)在看特朗普的了

SEOUL, South Korea — Rush-hour in South Korea’s over-caffeinated capital runs at a frenzy — so it was remarkable to see commuters freeze Friday morning and fixate on giant Samsung television screens showing the scene unfolding in the Demilitarized Zone, where time stopped in 1953.

韓國(guó)首爾——在咖啡因攝入過(guò)量的韓國(guó)首都，交通高峰時(shí)段總是那么瘋狂，所以周五上午的情景格外引人注目——通勤族停下腳步，目不轉(zhuǎn)睛地注視著著巨大的三星電視屏幕，上面播放著非軍事區(qū)正在發(fā)生的情景，在那個(gè)地方，時(shí)光還停留在1953年。

Kim Jong-un, in a black Mao suit, stepped across a low concrete barrier into the South Korean territory, a first for a North Korean leader since the catastrophic and unfinished war seven decades ago. He reached out to the South’s president, Moon Jae-in, and led him back over into the North’s territory.

金正恩(Kim Jong-un)穿著黑色中山裝，跨過(guò)低矮的混凝土屏障進(jìn)入韓國(guó)領(lǐng)土，自70年前那場(chǎng)迄今尚未結(jié)束的災(zāi)難性戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)以來(lái)，這是朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人第一次這樣做。他向韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)文在寅(Moon Jae-in)伸出手，領(lǐng)著他回到朝鮮領(lǐng)土。

It was a reminder, if anyone here needed one, that the 34-year-old Mr. Kim has played the master choreographer in this remarkable dance step along a nuclear precipice.

這是一種提醒——如果還有人需要提醒的話(huà)——34歲的金正恩在這場(chǎng)核懸崖上的精彩舞蹈中扮演了主要編舞者的角色。

Mr. Kim silenced those who thought he was too young and callow to rule by executing his uncle, fatally poisoning a half brother, installing his own generals and putting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs into overdrive.

金正恩處決了他的叔叔，毒死了他的異母哥哥，安插了自己的將軍，令朝鮮的核武器與導(dǎo)彈加速發(fā)展，讓那些認(rèn)為他年輕稚嫩，無(wú)法統(tǒng)治國(guó)家的人閉上了嘴。

And after spending 2017 proving that his backward nation could hurl missiles across the Pacific, and could test a weapon many times more powerful than the Hiroshima atomic bomb, Mr. Kim seized on an invitation from South Korea to take part in the 2018 Winter Olympics and suddenly played the statesman. On Friday he hinted anew that his nuclear arsenal might be on the table, if the price was right.

金正恩用整個(gè)2017年證明自己統(tǒng)治的這個(gè)落后國(guó)家有能力發(fā)射飛越太平洋的導(dǎo)彈，并且有能力測(cè)試威力超出廣島原子彈許多倍的武器;之后他應(yīng)韓國(guó)邀請(qǐng)，參與2018年冬季奧運(yùn)會(huì)，突然扮演起政治家的角色。周五他再次暗示，如果價(jià)碼合適，他的核武庫(kù)或許也是可以談判的。

President Trump insists that his own actions are responsible, that his threats of “fire and fury” and, more important, his intensified sanctions, forced Mr. Kim to this moment. He is partly right: Mr. Trump has shown an energy in confronting North Korea that President Barack Obama never did.

特朗普總統(tǒng)堅(jiān)稱(chēng)是自己的行為起了作用，他的“炮火與怒火”威脅，更重要的是他加緊制裁的行動(dòng)，迫使金正恩走到了這一刻。他在一定程度上是正確的：特朗普表現(xiàn)出了與朝鮮對(duì)抗的能量，這是貝拉克·奧巴馬(Barack Obama)總統(tǒng)從來(lái)不曾做過(guò)的。

But disarmament experts who watched the Korean leaders meet in the DMZ agreed that Mr. Kim had been driving the events.

但是觀看朝韓領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在非軍事區(qū)舉行會(huì)議的裁軍專(zhuān)家都認(rèn)為，一直在推動(dòng)這些事件的人是金正恩。

Mr. Kim has learned the art of surprise as surely as his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s founder and the younger Mr. Kim’s role model, did. The elder Mr. Kim caught the world unawares by invading the South in June 1950.

朝鮮開(kāi)國(guó)元?jiǎng)捉鹑粘墒墙鹫鞯淖娓?，也是這位年輕人的榜樣，顯然，和金日成一樣，金正恩也學(xué)會(huì)了出奇制勝的藝術(shù)——1950年6月，金日成入侵韓國(guó)，令全世界措手不及。

The Friday encounter did everything it was supposed to do to set up the next summit meeting, between Mr. Kim and Mr. Trump. That is the moment, South Koreans say, for any nuclear deal to be struck, something that can only happen when an American president is in the room.

周五的會(huì)晤完成了它所應(yīng)完成的一切任務(wù)，為金正恩和特朗普之間的下一次首腦會(huì)議做好了準(zhǔn)備。韓國(guó)人說(shuō)，現(xiàn)在到了這樣一個(gè)時(shí)刻，任何核協(xié)議都有可能達(dá)成，而這樣的協(xié)議只有在美國(guó)總統(tǒng)在場(chǎng)時(shí)才會(huì)發(fā)生。

The question is whether Mr. Kim is really ready to make that deal, or whether he is betting, as most experts think he is, that he can get help to normalize the North’s economy while keeping at least parts of a fearsome arsenal that he believes has kept the Kim family in power.

問(wèn)題是，金正恩是否真的準(zhǔn)備達(dá)成這筆交易，又或者他像大多數(shù)專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為的那樣，是在下賭注，看自己是否能在令朝鮮實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)正?；耐瑫r(shí)，至少保留一部分令人生畏的武器，他認(rèn)為金氏家族可以一直掌握權(quán)力正是因?yàn)檫@些武器。

The agreement published on Friday afternoon, as the two Korean leaders headed into a dinner that was rich in symbolism about the common traditions of the North and South, says little on the nuclear topic.

周五下午，朝韓兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人出席了一場(chǎng)充滿(mǎn)兩國(guó)共同傳統(tǒng)象征意義的晚宴，并公布了會(huì)談協(xié)議，其中幾乎沒(méi)有提及核問(wèn)題。

It sets a deadline of completing some kind of peace arrangement — not necessarily a treaty — by the end of this year. But it sets no schedule for denuclearization. That is a critical point, because until now the Trump administration’s position has been that the North must surrender all its weapons first, and that any talk of treaties or trade, or sanctions relief, would come only when its weapons, its uranium and plutonium and its missiles are securely out of the country.

協(xié)議設(shè)定了一個(gè)最后期限，在今年年底之前達(dá)成某種和平協(xié)議——不一定是一項(xiàng)條約。但它沒(méi)有設(shè)定無(wú)核化的時(shí)間表。這很關(guān)鍵，因?yàn)榈侥壳盀橹?，特朗普政府的立?chǎng)是，朝鮮必須首先交出它的所有武器，任何關(guān)于條約、貿(mào)易或解除制裁的談判只有在朝鮮的武器、鈾和钚以及導(dǎo)彈安全出國(guó)后才能進(jìn)行。

President Moon’s advisers insisted that the vagueness of the agreement published on Friday was a virtue, not a defect, and that it would be up to others to work out the details. But they also insist that “Chairman Kim,” as they called the young leader, is driven by different imperatives than his father and grandfather were. “They want a Trump Tower and a McDonald’s,” Moon Chung-in, a special adviser to the South Korean president, insisted in an interview with Christiane Amanpour on CNN on Friday.

文在寅總統(tǒng)的顧問(wèn)堅(jiān)稱(chēng)，星期五公布的協(xié)議含糊不清是它的優(yōu)點(diǎn)，而不是缺點(diǎn)，而細(xì)節(jié)需要其他人來(lái)填補(bǔ)。但他們也堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，“金主席”(他們這樣稱(chēng)呼年輕的朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人)，和他的父親與祖父有著不同的動(dòng)機(jī)。“他們想要一個(gè)特朗普大廈和一家麥當(dāng)勞餐廳，”韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)的特別顧問(wèn)文正仁(Moon Chung-in)周五接受CNN的克里斯汀·阿曼普(Christiane Amanpour)采訪時(shí)表示。

Perhaps they do — the North’s most famous hotel, in Pyongyang, the capital, leans so dangerously that it was never opened, and North Korea is not known for its fast-food chains. But ask the people who have seen past peace initiatives whether they think this one will work out any differently, and they have serious doubts that Mr. Kim will give up his nuclear program for any price.

興許確實(shí)如此——朝鮮最著名的酒店(位于首都平壤)傾斜嚴(yán)重，以至從未開(kāi)業(yè)，朝鮮也沒(méi)有著名的快餐連鎖。但問(wèn)那些見(jiàn)證了過(guò)去的和平協(xié)議的人是否認(rèn)為這一次的結(jié)果會(huì)有所不同時(shí)，他們嚴(yán)重懷疑金正恩無(wú)論如何都不會(huì)放棄核計(jì)劃。

Among the skeptics is Mr. Trump’s new secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, who made a secret visit to Pyongyang over Easter weekend to try to gauge Mr. Kim’s sincerity. Last summer, it was Mr. Pompeo, then still the C.I.A. director, who argued that the only way to deal with North Korea was to separate Mr. Kim from his weapons, a comment some interpreted as advocating regime change.

持懷疑態(tài)度的人包括特朗普新任命的國(guó)務(wù)卿克·龐皮歐(Mike Pompeo)。復(fù)活節(jié)那個(gè)周末，龐皮歐秘密訪問(wèn)平壤，想要試探金正恩的誠(chéng)意。去年夏天，正是時(shí)任中情局(CIA)局長(zhǎng)的龐皮歐聲稱(chēng)，對(duì)付朝鮮唯一的辦法是把金正恩和他的武器分開(kāi)。這番表述被一些人解讀為主張改朝換代。

On Friday at NATO, on his first full day as secretary of state, Mr. Pompeo suggested for the first time that the North Korean leader was ready to deal. “I did get a sense that he was serious,” he told reporters. “The economic pressure that has been put in place by this global effort that President Trump has led has led him to believe that it’s in his best interest to come to the table and talk about denuclearization.”

周五是龐皮歐上任國(guó)務(wù)卿的第一天。在北約，他首次稱(chēng)朝鮮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人做好了做交易的準(zhǔn)備。“我的確感覺(jué)他是認(rèn)真的，”他對(duì)記者說(shuō)。“特朗普總統(tǒng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的這場(chǎng)全球行動(dòng)帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力促使他相信，坐到談判桌上商討無(wú)核化問(wèn)題對(duì)他是最有利的。”

Yet talking is different from denuclearizing. And talking about denuclearizing is hardly new. The North promised the same in a 1992 agreement, and many in Seoul, the South’s capital, wondered then if the nightmare of living under the constant threat of artillery barrage was about to end. In fact, the agreement reached on Friday picks up language from the 1992 accord, and has similar provisions about reuniting families separated during the Korean War and nonaggression agreements. Little of it happened.

但商討和無(wú)核化是兩回事。商討無(wú)核化問(wèn)題也不是什么新鮮事。在1992年的一項(xiàng)協(xié)議中，朝鮮作出過(guò)同樣的承諾。當(dāng)時(shí)，韓國(guó)首都首爾的很多人好奇，生活在持續(xù)的炮火攻擊威脅下的噩夢(mèng)是不是就要結(jié)束了。實(shí)際上，周五達(dá)成的協(xié)議采用了1992年那份協(xié)議的表述，也有讓那些因朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)而分開(kāi)的家人團(tuán)圓，以及達(dá)成互不侵犯協(xié)議的類(lèi)似條款。但當(dāng)年的協(xié)議內(nèi)容幾乎無(wú)一兌現(xiàn)。

There were two agreements with the George W. Bush administration, each described at the time as breakthroughs. Since then the North has amassed 20 to 60 nuclear weapons, up from zero when those commitments were made.

朝鮮與喬治·W·布什(George W. Bush)政府達(dá)成了兩項(xiàng)協(xié)議。當(dāng)時(shí)，兩項(xiàng)協(xié)議都被稱(chēng)作突破性進(jìn)展。自那時(shí)以來(lái)，朝鮮已經(jīng)積累了20到60枚核武器，而它作出這些承諾時(shí)這個(gè)數(shù)字是零。

No one knows those numbers better than Mr. Pompeo, who spent a lot of time with the CI.A.’s Korea Mission unit, assessing the scope and imminence of its nuclear capabilities. “There’s a lot of history here, where promises have been made, hopes have been raised and then dashed,” the new secretary of state told reporters.

沒(méi)人比龐皮歐更了解這些數(shù)字。他曾和中情局朝鮮任務(wù)中心一起花大量時(shí)間評(píng)估朝鮮核實(shí)力的范圍和緊迫性。“在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上，有著漫長(zhǎng)的作出承諾、燃起希望然后希望破滅的歷史，”這位新上任的國(guó)務(wù)卿對(duì)記者說(shuō)。

Mr. Trump’s solution to not getting “played,” the phrase he so often uses about his predecessors and North Korea, is to keep what he calls a “maximum pressure campaign” on the North until denuclearization happens. The South Koreans say they agree. But the documents issued Friday hint at benefits that begin to flow to the North as they move toward a peace agreement, and a reduction of tensions.

為了不被“玩弄”——特朗普常常用這個(gè)詞來(lái)形容他的諸位前任與朝鮮的關(guān)系——特朗普的解決方案是堅(jiān)持對(duì)朝鮮實(shí)行他所說(shuō)的“最大壓力行動(dòng)”，直到實(shí)現(xiàn)無(wú)核化。韓國(guó)表示同意。但周五發(fā)布的文件暗示，在朝著和平協(xié)議的方向發(fā)展的過(guò)程中，好處開(kāi)始流向朝鮮，緊張局勢(shì)得到緩和。

China, which is largely interested in maintaining the status quo, could also loosen the restrictions on oil and goods, as long as negotiations play out. 只要談判展開(kāi)，在很大程度上希望保持現(xiàn)狀的中國(guó)可能也會(huì)放松對(duì)石油和商品的限制。

All this suggests that Mr. Trump’s challenge when he meets Mr. Kim, probably in early June, is growing. He must establish the process for the actual dismantlement of weapons, the removal of stockpiled uranium and plutonium bomb fuel from the country and a verification program that will be one of the most complex in history, given the vastness of North Korea’s mountains.

這一切都表明，和金正恩會(huì)面——可能會(huì)在6月初——時(shí)，特朗普面臨的挑戰(zhàn)正在加劇。他必須制定實(shí)際拆除武器、運(yùn)走朝鮮儲(chǔ)存的鈾和钚彈燃料并進(jìn)行核查的進(jìn)程?？紤]到朝鮮遼闊的山川，這將是史上最復(fù)雜的核查行動(dòng)之一。

In short, Mr. Trump must do better than Mr. Obama did in the Iran deal, an agreement Mr. Trump believes is so flawed it should be abandoned.

簡(jiǎn)而言之，特朗普必須比奧巴馬在伊朗核協(xié)議問(wèn)題上做得更好。特朗普認(rèn)為該協(xié)議缺陷嚴(yán)重，應(yīng)該被廢除。

What no one knows yet is the kind of concessions Kim is hoping to demand in return. Han Sung-joo, a former South Korean foreign minister who negotiated with the North for much of his career, says he believes he knows where this is headed.

但沒(méi)人知道金正恩希望得到什么樣的讓步作為回報(bào)。韓國(guó)前外長(zhǎng)韓升洲(Han Sung-Joo)職業(yè)生涯中的很多時(shí)候都在和朝鮮談判。他自稱(chēng)知道事情會(huì)朝什么方向發(fā)展。

“If Kim Jong Un indeed came up with the idea of the so-called peace momentum getting started, it was indeed a jackpot of an idea,” Han said this week. Kim’s goals, Han said, will be to “weaken international sanctions,” draw serious investment into the North and make the country’s nuclear status “a fait accompli.”

“如果金正恩真的想到了開(kāi)啟所謂的和平進(jìn)程這個(gè)主意，那也是為了這個(gè)主意能帶來(lái)的好處，”韓升洲在本周說(shuō)。他表示，金正恩的目標(biāo)是“減輕國(guó)際制裁”、讓大量投資進(jìn)入朝鮮并讓朝鮮的核地位成為“既成事實(shí)”。

Trump, in contrast, says he will solve the North Korea problem, once and for all. After Friday’s meeting, he will now face the task of explaining how.

相比之下，特朗普稱(chēng)他將徹底解決朝鮮問(wèn)題。周五的會(huì)面結(jié)束后，他現(xiàn)在面臨的任務(wù)是解釋如何做到這一點(diǎn)。