THE recognition of our own mistakes should not benefit us any more than the study of our successes.But there is a natural tendency in all men to avoid punishment.When you associate certain mistakes with a licking,you do not hanker for a second dose,and,of course,all stock-market mistakes wound you in two tender spots—your pocketbook and your vanity.But I will tell you something curious:A stock speculator sometimes makes mistakes and knows that he is making them.And after he makes them he will ask himself why he made them;and after thinking over it cold-bloodedly a long time after the pain of punishment is over he may learn how he came to make them,and when,and at what particular point of his trade;but not why.And then he simply calls himself names and lets it go at that.
Of course,if a man is both wise and lucky,he will not make the same mistake twice.But he will make any one of the ten thousand brothers or cousins of the original.The Mistake family is so large that there is always one of them around when you want to see what you can do in the fool-play line.
To tell you about the first of my million-dollar mistakes I shall have to go back to this time when I first became a millionaire,right after the big break of October,1907.As far as my trading went,having a million merely meant more reserves.Money does not give a trader more comfort,because,rich or poor,he can make mistakes and it is never comfortable to be wrong.And when a millionaire is right his money is merely one of his several servants.Losing money is the least of my troubles.A loss never bothers me after I take it.I forget it overnight.But being wrong—not taking the loss—that is what does the damage to the pocketbook and to the soul.You remember Dickson G.Watts' story about the man who was so nervous that a friend asked him what was the matter.
“I can't sleep,”answered the nervous one.
“Why not?”asked the friend.
“I am carrying so much cotton that I can't sleep thinking about it.It is wearing me out.What can I do?”
“Sell down to the sleeping point,”answered the friend.
As a rule a man adapts himself to conditions so quickly that he loses the perspective.He does not feel the difference much—that is,he does not vividly remember how it felt not to be a millionaire.He only remembers that there were things he could not do that he can do now.It does not take a reasonably young and normal man very long to lose the habit of being poor.It requires a little longer to forget that he used to be rich.I suppose that is because money creates needs or encourages their multiplication.I mean that after a man makes money in the stock market he very quickly loses the habit of not spending.But after he loses his money it takes him a long time to lose the habit of spending.
After I took in my shorts and went long in October,1907,I decided to take it easy for a while.I bought a yacht and planned to go off on a cruise in Southern waters.I am crazy about fishing and I was due to have the time of my life.I looked forward to it and expected to go any day.But I did not.The market wouldn't let me.
I always have traded in commodities as well as in stocks.I began as a youngster in the bucket shops.I studied those markets for years,though perhaps not so assiduously as the stock market.As a matter of fact,I would rather play commodities than stocks.There is no question about their greater legitimacy,as it were.It partakes more of the nature of a commercial venture than trading in stocks does.A man can approach it as he might any mercantile problem.It may be possible to use fictitious arguments for or against a certain trend in a commodity market;but success will be only temporary,for in the end the facts are bound to prevail,so that a trader gets dividends on study and observation,as he does in a regular business.He can watch and weigh conditions and he knows as much about it as anyone else.He need not guard against inside cliques.Dividends are not unexpectedly passed or increased overnight in the cotton market or in wheat or corn.In the long run commodity prices are governed but by one law—the economic law of demand and supply.The business of the trader in commodities is simply to get facts about the demand and the supply,present and prospective.He does not indulge in guesses about a dozen things as he does in stocks.It always appealed to me—trading in commodities.
Of course the same things happen in all speculative markets.The message of the tape is the same.That will be perfectly plain to anyone who will take the trouble to think.He will find if he asks himself questions and considers conditions,that the answers will supply themselves directly.But people never take the trouble to ask questions,leave alone seeking answers.The average American is from Missouri everywhere and at all times except when he goes to the brokers' offices and looks at the tape,whether it is stocks or commodities.The one game of all games that really requires study before making a play is the one he goes into without his usual highly intelligent preliminary and precautionary doubts.He will risk half his fortune in the stock market with less reflection than he devotes to the selection of a medium-priced automobile.
This matter of tape reading is not so complicated as it appears.Of course you need experience.But it is even more important to keep certain fundamentals in mind.To read the tape is not to have your fortune told.The tape does not tell you how much you will surely be worth next Thursday at 1:35 P.M.The object of reading the tape is to ascertain,first,how and,next,when to trade—that is,whether it is wiser to buy than to sell.It works exactly the same for stocks as for cotton or wheat or corn or oats.
You watch the market—that is,the course of prices as recorded by the tape—with one object:to determine the direction—that is,the price tendency.Prices,we know,will move either up or down according to the resistance they encounter.For purposes of easy explanation we will say that prices,like everything else,move along the line of least resistance.They will do whatever comes easiest,therefore they will go up if there is less resistance to an advance than to a decline;and vice versa.
Nobody should be puzzled as to whether a market is a bull or a bear market after it fairly starts.The trend is evident to a man who has an open mind and reasonably clear sight,for it is never wise for a speculator to fit his facts to his theories.Such a man will,or ought to,know whether it is a bull or a bear market,and if he knows that he knows whether to buy or to sell.It is therefore at the very inception of the movement that a man needs to know whether to buy or to sell.
Let us say,for example,that the market,as it usually does in those between-swings times,fluctuates within a range of ten points;up to 130 and down to 120.It may look very weak at the bottom;or,on the way up,after a rise of eight or ten points,it may look as strong as anything.A man ought not to be led into trading by tokens.He should wait until the tape tells him that the time is ripe.As a matter of fact,millions upon millions of dollars have been lost by men who bought stocks because they looked cheap or sold them because they looked dear.The speculator is not an investor.His object is not to secure a steady return on his money at a good rate of interest,but to profit by either a rise or a fall in the price of whatever he may be speculating in.Therefore the thing to determine is the speculative line of least resistance at the moment of trading;and what he should wait for is the moment when that line defines itself,because that is his signal to get busy.
Reading the tape merely enables him to see that at 130 the selling had been stronger than the buying and a reaction in the price logically followed.Up to the point where the selling prevailed over the buying,superficial students of the tape may conclude that the price is not going to stop short of 150,and they buy.But after the reaction begins they hold on,or sell out at a small loss,or they go short and talk bearish.But at 120 there is stronger resistance to the decline.The buying prevails over the selling,there is a rally and the shorts cover.The public is so often whipsawed that one marvels at their persistence in not learning their lesson.
Eventually something happens that increases the power of either the upward or the downward force and the point of greatest resistance moves up or down—that is,the buying at 130 will for the first time be stronger than the selling,or the selling at 120 be stronger than the buying.The price will break through the old barrier or movement-limit and go on.As a rule,there is always a crowd of traders who are short at 120 because it looked so weak,or long at 130 because it looked so strong,and,when the market goes against them they are forced,after a while,either to change their minds and turn or to close out.In either event they help to define even more clearly the price line of least resistance.Thus the intelligent trader who has patiently waited to determine this line will enlist the aid of fundamental trade conditions and also of the force of the trading of that part of the community that happened to guess wrong and must now rectify mistakes.Such corrections tend to push prices along the line of least resistance.
And right here I will say that,though I do not give it as a mathematical certainty or as an axiom of speculation,my experience has been that accidents—that is,the unexpected or unforeseen—have always helped me in my market position whenever the latter has been based upon my determination of the line of least resistance.Do you remember that Union Pacific episode at Saratoga that I told you about?Well,I was long because I found out that the line of least resistance was upward.I should have stayed long instead of letting my broker tell me that insiders were selling stocks.It didn't make any difference what was going on in the directors' minds.That was something I couldn't possibly know.But I could and did know that the tape said:“Going up!”And then came the unexpected raising of the dividend rate and the thirty point rise in the stock.At 164 prices looked mighty high,but as I told you before,stocks are never too high to buy or too low to sell.The price,per se,has nothing to do with establishing my line of least resistance.
You will find in actual practice that if you trade as I have indicated any important piece of news given out between the closing of one market and the opening of another is usually in harmony with the line of least resistance.The trend has been established before the news is published,and in bull markets bear items are ignored and bull news exaggerated,and vice versa.Before the war broke out the market was in a very weak condition.There came the proclamation of Germany's submarine policy.I was short one hundred and fifty thousand shares of stock,not because I knew the news was coming,but because I was going along the line of least resistance.What happened came out of a clear sky,as far as my play was concerned.Of course I took advantage of the situation and I covered my shorts that day.
It sounds very easy to say that all you have to do is to watch the tape,establish your resistance points and be ready to trade along the line of least resistance as soon as you have determined it.But in actual practice a man has to guard against many things,and most of all against himself—that is,against human nature.That is the reason why I say that the man who is right always has two forces working in his favor—basic conditions and the men who are wrong.In a bull market bear factors are ignored.That is human nature,and yet human beings profess astonishment at it.People will tell you that the wheat crop has gone to pot because there has been bad weather in one or two sections and some farmers have been ruined.When the entire crop is gathered and all the farmers in all the wheat-growing sections begin to take their wheat to the elevators the bulls are surprised at the smallness of the damage.They discover that they merely have helped the bears.
When a man makes his play in a commodity market he must not permit himself set opinions.He must have an open mind and flexibility.It is not wise to disregard the message of the tape,no matter what your opinion of crop conditions or of the probable demand may be.I recall how I missed a big play just by trying to anticipate the starting signal.I felt so sure of conditions that I thought it was not necessary to wait for the line of least resistance to define itself.I even thought I might help it arrive,because it looked as if it merely needed a little assistance.
I was very bullish on cotton.It was hanging around twelve cents,running up and down within a moderate range.It was in one of those in-between places and I could see it.I knew I really ought to wait.But I got to thinking that if I gave it a little push it would go beyond the upper resistance point.
I bought fifty thousand bales.Sure enough,it moved up.And sure enough,as soon as I stopped buying it stopped going up.Then it began to settle back to where it was when I began buying it.I got out and it stopped going down.I thought I was now much nearer the starting signal,and presently I thought I'd start it myself again.I did.The same thing happened.I bid it up,only to see it go down when I stopped.I did this four or five times until I finally quit in disgust.It cost me about two hundred thousand dollars.I was done with it.It wasn't very long after that when it began to go up and never stopped till it got to a price that would have meant a killing for me—if I hadn't been in such a great hurry to start.
This experience has been the experience of so many traders so many times that I can give this rule:In a narrow market,when prices are not getting anywhere to speak of but move within a narrow range,there is no sense in trying to anticipate what the next big movement is going to be—up or down.The thing to do is to watch the market,read the tape to determine the limits of the get-nowhere prices,and make up your mind that you will not take an interest until the price breaks through the limit in either direction.A speculator must concern himself with making money out of the market and not with insisting that the tape must agree with him.Never argue with it or ask it for reasons or explanations.Stock-market post-mortems don't pay dividends.
Not so long ago I was with a party of friends.They got to talking wheat.Some of them were bullish and others bearish.Finally they asked me what I thought.Well,I had been studying the market for some time.I knew they did not want any statistics or analyses of conditions.So I said:“If you want to make some money out of wheat I can tell you how to do it.”
They all said they did and I told them,“If you are sure you wish to make money in wheat just you watch it.Wait.The moment it crosses $1.20 buy it and you will get a nice quick play in it!”
“Why not buy it now,at $1.14?”one of the party asked.
“Because I don't know yet that it is going up at all.”
“Then why buy it at $1.20?It seems a mighty high price.”
“Do you wish to gamble blindly in the hope of getting a great big profit or do you wish to speculate intelligently and get a smaller but much more probable profit?”
They all said they wanted the smaller but surer profit,so I said,“Then do as I tell you.If it crosses $1.20 buy.”
As I told you,I had watched it a long time.For months it sold between $1.10 and $1.20,getting nowhere in particular.Well,sir,one day it closed at above $1.I9.I got ready for it.Sure enough the next day it opened at $1.20?,and I bought.It went to $1.21,to $1.22,to $1.23,to $1.25,and I went with it.
Now I couldn't have told you at the time just what was going on.I didn't get any explanations about its behaviour during the course of the limited fluctuations.I couldn't tell whether the breaking through the limit would be up through $1.20 or down through $1.10,though I suspected it would be up because there was not enough wheat in the world for a big break in prices.
As a matter of fact,it seems Europe had been buying quietly and a lot of traders had gone short of it at around $1.19.Owing to the European purchases and other causes,a lot of wheat had been taken out of the market,so that finally the big movement got started.The price went beyond the $1.20 mark.That was all the point I had and it was all I needed.I knew that when it crossed $1.20 it would be because the upward movement at last had gathered force to push it over the limit and something had to happen.In other words,by crossing $1.20 the line of least resistance of wheat prices was established.It was a different story then.
I remember that one day was a holiday with us and all our markets were closed.Well,in Winnipeg wheat opened up six cents a bushel.When our market opened on the following day,it also was up six cents a bushel.The price just went along the line of least resistance.
What I have told you gives you the essence of my trading system as based on studying the tape.I merely learn the way prices are most probably going to move.I check up my own trading by additional tests,to determine the psychological moment.I do that by watching the way the price acts after I begin.
It is surprising how many experienced traders there are who look incredulous when I tell them that when I buy stocks for a rise I like to pay top prices and when I sell I must sell low or not at all.It would not be so difficult to make money if a trader always stuck to his speculative guns—that is,waited for the line of least resistance to define itself and began buying only when the tape said up or selling only when it said down.He should accumulate his line on the way up.Let him buy one-fifth of his full line.If that does not show him a profit he must not increase his holdings because he has obviously begun wrong;he is wrong temporarily and there is no profit in being wrong at any time.The same tape that said UP did not necessarily lie merely because it is now saying NOT YET.
In cotton I was very successful in my trading for a long time.I had my theory about it and I absolutely lived up to it.Suppose I had decided that my line would be forty to fifty thousand bales.Well,I would study the tape as I told you,watching for an opportunity either to buy or to sell.Suppose the line of least resistance indicated a bull movement.Well,I would buy ten thousand bales.After I got through buying that,if the market went up ten points over my initial purchase price,I would take on another ten thousand bales.Same thing.Then,if I could get twenty points' profit,or one dollar a bale,I would buy twenty thousand more.That would give me my line—my basis for my trading.But if after buying the first ten or twenty thousand bales,it showed me a loss,out I'd go.I was wrong.It might be I was only temporarily wrong.But as I have said before it doesn't pay to start wrong in anything.
What I accomplished by sticking to my system was that I always had a line of cotton in every real movement.In the course of accumulating my full line I might chip out fifty or sixty thousand dollars in these feeling-out plays of mine.This looks like a very expensive testing,but it wasn't.After the real movement started,how long would it take me to make up the fifty thousand dollars I had dropped in order to make sure that I began to load up at exactly the right time?No time at all!It always pays a man to be right at the right time.
As I think I also said before,this describes what I may call my system for placing my bets.It is simple arithmetic to prove that it is a wise thing to have the big bet down only when you win,and when you lose to lose only a small exploratory bet,as it were.If a man trades in the way I have described,he will always be in the profitable position of being able to cash in on the big bet.
Professional traders have always had some system or other based upon their experience and governed either by their attitude toward speculation or by their desires.I remember I met an old gentleman in Palm Beach whose name I did not catch or did not at once identify.I knew he had been in the Street for years,way back in Civil War times,and somebody told me that he was a very wise old codger who had gone through so many booms and panics that he was always saying there was nothing new under the sun and least of all in the stock market.
The old fellow asked me a lot of questions.When I got through telling him about my usual practice in trading he nodded and said,“Yes!Yes!You're right.The way you're built,the way your mind runs,makes your system a good system for you.It comes easy for you to practice what you preach,because the money you bet is the least of your cares.I recollect Pat Hearne.Ever hear of him?Well,he was a very well-known sporting man and he had an account with us.Clever chap and nervy.He made money in stocks,and that made people ask him for advice.He would never give any.If they asked him point-blank for his opinion about the wisdom of their commitments he used a favourite race-track maxim of his:“You can't tell till you bet.”He traded in our office.He would buy one hundred shares of some active stock and when,or if,it went up 1 per cent he would buy another hundred.On another point's advance,another hundred shares;and so on.He used to say he wasn't playing the game to make money for others and therefore he would put in a stop-loss order one point below the price of his last purchase.When the price kept going up he simply moved up his stop with it.On a 1 per cent reaction he was stopped out.He declared he did not see any sense in losing more than one point,whether it came out of his original margin or out of his paper profits.
“You know,a professional gambler is not looking for long shots,but for sure money.Of course long shots are fine when they come in.In the stock market Pat wasn't after tips or playing to catch twenty-points-a-week advances,but sure money in sufficient quantity to provide him with a good living.Of all the thousands of outsiders that I have run across in Wall Street,Pat Hearne was the only one who saw in stock speculation merely a game of chance like faro or roulette,but,nevertheless,had the sense to stick to a relatively sound betting method.
“After Hearne's death one of our customers who had always traded with Pat and used his system made over one hundred thousand dollars in Lackawanna.Then he switched over to some other stock and because he had made a big stake he thought he need not stick to Pat's way.When a reaction came,instead of cutting short his losses he let them run—as though they were profits.Of course every cent went.When he finally quit he owed us several thousand dollars.
“He hung around for two or three years.He kept the fever long after the cash had gone;but we did not object as long as he behaved himself.I remember that he used to admit freely that he had been ten thousand kinds of an ass not to stick to Pat Hearne's style of play.Well,one day he came to me greatly excited and asked me to let him sell some stock short in our office.He was a nice enough chap who had been a good customer in his day and I told him I personally would guarantee his account for one hundred shares.
“He sold short one hundred shares of Lake Shore.That was the time Bill Travers hammered the market,in 1875.My friend Roberts put out that Lake Shore at exactly the right time and kept selling it on the way down as he had been wont to do in the old successful days before he forsook Pat Hearne's system and instead listened to hope's whispers.
“Well,sir,in four days of successful pyramiding,Roberts' account showed him a profit of fifteen thousand dollars.Observing that he had not put in a stop-loss order I spoke to him about it and he told me that the break hadn't fairly begun and he wasn't going to be shaken out by any one-point reaction.This was in August.Before the middle of September he borrowed ten dollars from me for a baby carriage—his fourth.He did not stick to his own proved system.That's the trouble with most of them,”and the old fellow shook his head at me.
And he was right.I sometimes think that speculation must be an unnatural sort of business,because I find that the average speculator has arrayed against him his own nature.The weaknesses that all men are prone to are fatal to success in speculation—usually those very weaknesses that make him likable to his fellows or that he himself particularly guards against in those other ventures of his where they are not nearly so dangerous as when he is trading in stocks or commodities.
The speculator's chief enemies are always boring from within.It is inseparable from human nature to hope and to fear.In speculation when the market goes against you you hope that every day will be the last day—and you lose more than you should had you not listened to hope—to the same ally that is so potent a success-bringer to empire builders and pioneers,big and little.And when the market goes your way you become fearful that the next day will take away your profit,and you get out—too soon.Fear keeps you from making as much money as you ought to.The successful trader has to fight these two deep-seated instincts.He has to reverse what you might call his natural impulses.Instead of hoping he must fear;instead of fearing he must hope.He must fear that his loss may develop into a much bigger loss,and hope that his profit may become a big profit.It is absolutely wrong to gamble in stocks the way the average man does.
I have been in the speculative game ever since I was fourteen.It is all I have ever done.I think I know what I am talking about.And the conclusion that I have reached after nearly thirty years of constant trading,both on a shoestring and with millions of dollars back of me,is this:A man may beat a stock or a group at a certain time,but no man living can beat the stock market!A man may make money out of individual deals in cotton or grain,but no man can beat the cotton market or the grain market.It's like the track.A man may beat a horse race,but he cannot beat horse racing.
If I knew how to make these statements stronger or more emphatic I certainly would.It does not make any difference what anybody says to the contrary.I know I am right in saying these are incontrovertible statements.
我們認識到錯誤,應(yīng)該不會比研究自己為什么成功更有好處。大家自然都不想受到錯誤的懲罰,當犯錯帶來惡果后,誰也不想重蹈覆轍,來自股市的錯誤會對你造成財產(chǎn)和自尊上的雙重傷害。不過我要告訴你一些奇怪的現(xiàn)象:有時候交易商們做錯事情的時候,是心知肚明的。他們出錯后會自問原因,當后果帶來的痛苦煙消云散后,思考良久,他們就有可能搞明白,自己什么時候、在哪里、怎么樣出了錯,可他不會知道出錯的原因,只會罵自己一句,然后就放過了。
當然,如果一個人既聰明又運氣比較好,就不會在同一條道上摔倒兩次,可其他那么多類似的錯誤保不齊就會犯。世界上的錯真是太多,當你每次想知道自己會不會出錯時,可能有個錯就悄悄守在你身邊。
要告訴你我的第一個百萬美元的錯誤,就得從1907年10月我第一次成為百萬富翁后開始說。以我的交易而言,一百萬只是說明我多了點保證金。金錢本身不會給股民帶來更多的舒適,因為不管貧窮還是富有,都會出錯,這是讓人永遠不爽的事情。當事情做對的時候,金錢只是個工具。賠錢對我也始終沒產(chǎn)生過困擾,過上一天我就會忘掉。若做錯了事情而不愿意接受所受的虧損,那就不光是金錢的損失了,心靈也會受到傷害。你還記得迪克森·華茲講過的一件小事吧。有個人特別緊張,朋友問他到底怎么了。
他說:“我總失眠?!?/p>
朋友問原因,他說:“我的棉花期貨的頭寸特別大,想想就難以入睡,我被折騰得筋疲力盡。我該怎么辦?”
朋友勸他:“賣掉吧,讓你的頭寸少到你能睡踏實的程度?!?/p>
一般而言,人是很能適應(yīng)環(huán)境而喪失洞察能力的動物。他察覺不到有多大區(qū)別,就是說,他基本上不可能想起還沒成為百萬富翁的時候自己是什么感覺了,而只知道一些當時做不了,現(xiàn)在卻可以做的事情。年輕、正常、理智的人由儉入奢易,由奢入儉難。我覺得原因是金錢會挑起人的欲望,人們總是多少抱著多多益善的觀念。意思是說,當有人從股市賺了錢后,很快就紙醉金迷了,可一旦他又沒錢了,要改掉大手大腳的習慣,就得花很長時間。
1907年10月,我不再做空而是開始做多。我計劃先放松一下,于是就買了一艘游艇,想去南邊的海域游玩一趟。我特別喜歡釣魚,總想著要好好釣一場魚,也盼望有實現(xiàn)的那一天,可股市卻總不能讓我如愿。
一直以來,我既進行股票交易,也玩商品期貨。年輕的時候,我就開始在對賭行做期貨交易了。這些年來,我一直在研究期貨市場,只不過不像對股市那樣上心。其實相比較的話,我更偏向做期貨,不是因為它看起來更正統(tǒng),雖然確實如此,可它也具備更高的風險。用一個假設(shè)的理由來反對或者支持期貨市場的價格走向,即便成功也是短暫的,最后還是事實得到勝利。所以,就像做其他普通生意一樣,交易商們總是靠研究和觀察得到報酬。他可以觀察和考慮各種情況,而且可以跟別人知道的一樣多。他不用跟幕后集團做斗爭。在棉花、小麥、玉米期貨市場上,沒有紅利分配這一說法。長久以來,商品價格只受一種法則主導(dǎo)——供需的經(jīng)濟法則。玩期貨的人只要知道供求狀態(tài)、現(xiàn)況和趨勢就行,不用像炒股一樣對很多事情做預(yù)估,所以期貨對我的吸引力更大。
所有的投機市場都有相同點,行情走勢的分析技巧是一樣的。對于所有熱衷于思考的人而言,這一點非常清楚。如果人多問自己幾個為什么,對各個因素考慮明白,答案就直接出來了。可是人們總是懶于發(fā)問,更不用說找答案了。一般美國人生性多疑,而且任何時候都是這樣,只有到經(jīng)紀商那里看盤的時候例外,不管看的是股票還是商品。在所有的游戲當中,玩之前真正需要研究的一種游戲,剛好就是美國人沒有利用平常慣有的高度警覺和極為聰明的準備就投身其中的游戲。有的人拿出自己的一半身家去冒險時,花在思考上的時間還沒買一輛車時考慮的時間長。
分析行情并沒那么難。當然這需要經(jīng)驗,但是更需要的是在心里記住一些基本要素。分析情勢并不是為了知道運氣好不好,它可不會對你說下周四下午一點三十五你會有多少錢。分析行情是為了如何交易和什么時候交易——也就是說,應(yīng)該買還是賣,這些對股票、棉花、小麥和玉米都一樣有效。
你觀察市場自然是依靠行情記錄機顯示的價格情況,目的只有一個,就是確定方向,即價格走向。我們知道,價格會根據(jù)實際情況上漲或者下跌。為了簡單解釋清楚,我們把價格看作跟其他東西一樣,在沿著最小阻力線變化。它們通常是怎么變化容易就會怎么變,所以當上漲阻力小于下跌阻力時,價格就會上漲,反過來也一樣。
如果股市開局很穩(wěn),后面不管牛市還是熊市,都不應(yīng)該感到困惑。對一個思維敏捷并很有眼光的人而言,趨勢很明顯。對于投機客來說,總想著拿理論往事實身上死套,是很愚蠢的。清楚了是牛市還是熊市,就知道了該買還是該賣。人就應(yīng)該在市場一開始就判斷出走向。
比如,假設(shè)市場一如既往地起起伏伏,波動在10個點內(nèi),最高能漲到130,最低跌到120??赡墚斔斓街吸c120時,就會勁力不足而顯得疲軟?;蛘咴谏蠞q8個點或10個點的路上,看起來特別強勁。你不應(yīng)該根據(jù)某些簡單跡象就貿(mào)然行動,而是應(yīng)該根據(jù)行情記錄來判斷時機是否已到。其實人們因為價格看起來便宜就買,或是因為價格看起來貴就賣,已經(jīng)損失了幾千萬美元。投機的人跟投資的人不一樣,他不是為了得到穩(wěn)定回報,而是在價格的上下變動中謀取利益。所以他需要確定的是哪個投機路線阻力最小,他應(yīng)該等待市場自行確定最高上漲點和最低下跌點,這是交易上該遵循的原則。
在看行情走勢的時候,你覺得股價在130時,賣掉比買進要好。市場在持續(xù)變化,那些對行情分析半瓶子醋的人就會覺得股價能漲到150,所以買進,可是當價格回落時他們要么堅持,要么甘愿接受現(xiàn)實而做空。在120的時候,股價下跌遇到的阻力比較大,買比賣強,價格開漲,空頭又去回補。很多人通常就是這樣兩面受打擊,還總不吸取教訓(xùn),真是讓人深感奇怪。
反正最終肯定會出現(xiàn)讓漲或跌變得比較強勢的事,最大阻力點會上升或者下降。也就是說,在130的時候,買盤比賣盤強,而在120的時候則相反。價格會突破波動的區(qū)間而繼續(xù)變動,很多人總會在120時做空,因為貌似市場很疲弱,而在130的時候正相反。當股市不利于他們時,他們就只能認栽。就是這些人協(xié)助確立了阻力位和支撐點。一些聰明又很有耐心的人卻等著股市走向明確,他們會利用基本交易形式來幫忙,也會利用那些做錯的人們對市場產(chǎn)生的交易力量而賺錢。那些人的錯誤會把價格推向最小阻力點。
我說的這個并不是很精確和公認的理論,但是每當我靠著自己對阻力最小的路線所做的判斷,決定市場方向時,我的經(jīng)驗是,這些意外事件總是會順從我的市場方向,也就是突發(fā)或無法預(yù)見的事件總是協(xié)助我做的市場方向。你還記得我提到過的那次在薩拉托加太平洋鐵路公司的股票事件嗎?我做了多頭,是因為我覺得最小阻力線在上升。我就該堅持做多頭,而不是聽經(jīng)紀人的話賣掉。公司董事們心里想什么沒有任何差別,反正這也不是我能知道的事情。接著果然就發(fā)生了配股率突然提高,股價漲了30點的事情。股價若到了164,看起來就非常高了,可正如我之前所說,股價絕對不會高得不能買進,或是低得不能賣出。股價的高低,從本質(zhì)上來說,與確立最小阻力線沒什么關(guān)系。
如果你按照我說的方法交易,實際炒股時你會知道,收盤后出來的大信息通常都配合阻力最小的路線。在消息出來前,走向就已經(jīng)定了。牛市時,人們會忽視利空消息,而夸大利好消息,反過來也一樣。世界大戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)前,股市很不好。德國宣布了無限制潛艇戰(zhàn)政策。我當時放空了50萬,并不是我得到了什么消息,而是我沿著最小阻力線來做。就我的操作而言,德國的宣布好比晴天霹靂。我利用這種情況,當天就回補了空頭。
我說你只需要觀察股市行情,確立好關(guān)口,只要你確定最小阻力線后,就準備沿著這條線路交易,這聽起來很簡單??墒?,在實際的交易過程中,卻必須要防備很多事情,最重要的是要小心你自己——也就是要對抗人心的弱點。這就是為什么我說正確的人總有股力量——基本情勢和錯誤的人——在幫助他。在牛市期,人們會對利空消息不那么重視,這就是人性,可人們還對這一點表示震驚。因為一兩個地區(qū)的天氣很惡劣,大家會告訴你說,小麥作物完了,等到整個作物收成,所有的產(chǎn)區(qū)的小麥都被送到谷倉時,多頭會驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn)損害程度如此輕微。他們發(fā)現(xiàn),自己只是幫了空頭的忙。
做期貨交易,不能保持固定不變的思維,而必須要思維活躍。不管你對谷物供需情況持什么態(tài)度,都不要忽略行情記錄里面的信息。我記得有一次我由于魯莽錯失了良機。我對情勢很確定,覺得沒必要等待最小阻力線,我甚至有過要幫它確立的想法,因為好像只需要一點點協(xié)助就行了。
我覺得棉花會暴漲。棉花當時一直在每磅12美分上下浮動,范圍很小。我知道自己應(yīng)該稍等一下,可我同時覺得只要稍微推一下,就可以讓它突破阻力位。
我買了5萬包棉花,它果然漲了。我一停止買進,它也就不再繼續(xù)上漲,接著跌落到了我開始買進時的價格。我退出來,它也就不跌了。我認為我現(xiàn)在更接近出發(fā)點了,于是我立刻認為我應(yīng)該再度出發(fā)。我也這樣做了。同樣的事情又發(fā)生了一次,我抬高了價格,一停止買進我就看到價格下跌。我來來回回這樣做了四五次,最終只好放棄,一共賠了20萬。沒過多久,棉花又開始漲了,居然漲到了讓我恨死自己的程度,如果我不那么急著開始該多好啊。
很多玩家都經(jīng)歷過很多次這樣的事情,所以我定了一條原則:市場窄幅波動時,價格波動范圍很小,要預(yù)估下一個大波動是往上還是往下,這個實在沒什么意義。應(yīng)該做的事情是觀察市場,分析走向,判定浮動上下線,在價格沒有突破上下線時,千萬不要有所行動。投機的人必須要一心一意靠市場獲利,而非堅持等大盤形勢與自己的預(yù)估一樣。永遠不要向綜合行情叫板,不要詢問理由或解釋。事后替股市解剖驗尸沒有任何好處。
前不久,我和幾個朋友在一起,他們在討論小麥期貨。有人覺得會漲,有人覺得會跌,他們最后問我的看法。我已經(jīng)有了一段時間的市場經(jīng)驗,我知道他們想得到的不是統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù),也不是對行情的判斷,因此我說:“你們要是想在小麥市場賺錢,我可以教你們方法?!?/p>
他們當然說想賺錢,我就說:“你們要是真想賺錢的話,觀察情勢就可以,然后等著,耐心點。等到1.2美元的時候就買進,就能賺很大一筆。”
“為什么現(xiàn)在不買?才1.14美元?!庇腥苏f。
“因為現(xiàn)在還不能確定上漲的真實性?!?/p>
“那為什么要在1.2美元時買進?不是更貴了嗎?”
“你想魯莽地大賺一次,還是明智又保險地少賺點呢?”
他們都回答說,最好是穩(wěn)穩(wěn)當當賺點。于是我說:“那就聽我的沒錯,1.2美元時再去買?!?/p>
我所料沒錯,我已經(jīng)觀察了很長時間。幾個月來,小麥一直在1.1和1.2美元間浮動,沒其他特殊的狀況出現(xiàn)。終于有一天,收市時的價格是1.19美元。我早做了準備,如果沒什么意外的話,第二天開盤價就是1.205美元。所以我買進了。小麥的價格從1.21漲到了1.25,我當然是一路加碼了。
此時我跟你說不清到底是怎么回事,我對它的小小浮動也給不出解釋,我不能告訴你,浮動只向上突破1.2還是向下跌破1.1。我覺得就是會上漲,因為當時小麥非常缺乏。
其實,歐洲似乎一直在悄悄地買進,很多人在1.19美元時放空。因為歐洲人的買入,加上其他一些原因,很多小麥都被轉(zhuǎn)運從市場上消失了,因此最后出現(xiàn)了大波動,價格突破1.20美元。這是我的觀點,也是我需要的唯一事實。我明白因為價格上漲積攢了力量,到了1.20美元時就會沖破上限。也就是說,過了1.20這個線,小麥價格的最小阻力線就確立了,隨后的情形就不大相同了。
我記得那天是美國的節(jié)假日,美國所有市場都閉市。加拿大溫尼伯在開盤時卻每蒲式耳漲了6美分,第二天美國市場開盤時,也漲了6美分。價格只是按照阻力最小的路線在前行而已。
我說的這一切表明,我玩這些的主要方法就是研究市場行情。我只是了解了價格最可能的前行方向,我會多玩幾次繼續(xù)驗證我的判斷。我從一開始就注意觀察,我的交易讓市場價格發(fā)生了什么變化。
我買股票的時候,喜歡以高價買入,以低價賣出,很多經(jīng)驗豐富的股民聽到這種話時都會露出吃驚的表情。如果交易者總是堅持自己的投機利器,賺錢不是什么難事。就是說,等到最小阻力線明確了以后,行情上漲的時候買進,下跌的時候賣出,并且應(yīng)該一路加碼,要賺錢并不困難。例如在上漲時積攢頭寸,先買進總量的五分之一,若沒有多少利潤,就要停止買入,因為很明顯一開始就搞錯了,或者至少是暫時錯了,不管什么時候出了錯,都不會有錢可賺的。行情記錄說會上漲,不見得是說謊,完全是因為行情記錄現(xiàn)在是說:“還沒到時候”。
我做棉花期貨一直很成功。我有自己的理論,而且絕對遵照這個理論。如果我想做到四五萬包,那么我就會像之前說的那樣,研究好市場行情,搞明白到底是該買還是該賣。如果最小阻力線有上升跡象,我就會先買1萬,然后市場如果還在上漲,我就會再來1萬。如果我有20個點的利潤,或者每包能賺1美元,我就會繼續(xù)買2萬包,然后達到滿倉,我就是用這個方法賺錢的??扇粑屹I了一兩萬包以后,有波動性的虧損,那就要平倉。這說明我看錯了形勢,或者只是暫時錯了,可我不是提到過嗎,不管哪種錯,都不會有錢可賺。
我堅持自己的那一套,借著它我在每次的棉花市場波動時,都能夠保持住自己的實力。在建倉的時候,可能會用暫時虧損五六萬的操作去驗證市場。貌似這個驗證有點太貴了,可實際卻不見得。當市場正兒八經(jīng)開始時,我損失的那點錢很快就會賺回來。不要不放過機會,在正確的時刻采取正確的行動,就會賺到錢。
我已經(jīng)說了我在市場交易時的整套方法。只在賺錢的時候下大注,而錯的時候也就只虧損了那點用來測試的錢,這是個聰明的做法。如果按照我說的這種辦法去玩,就會一直保持住有錢可賺的頭寸,能在大賭注中獲利不少。
專業(yè)玩家們總能依靠自己的經(jīng)驗,建立各種玩法,這些都取決于他們?nèi)绾螌Υ稒C這件事。我記得在棕櫚灘的時候,碰到過一位老人,猛然間還想不起他叫什么名字。我知道他從南北戰(zhàn)爭時期就在華爾街混江湖,有人告訴我說他非常聰明,身經(jīng)百戰(zhàn),因此他喜歡說世界上沒什么新鮮事物,至少股市中是沒有的。
老人問了我很多問題,我告訴他我平時是怎么樣做的,他點著頭說:“沒錯,沒錯,你是對的,你的做事方式和思維方法,都對你非常有用。你很容易按照自己的想法行事,因為你投進去的錢是你最不重視的部分。我想起了帕特·赫恩這個人,你聽過吧?他是個很有名的賭客,在我們那邊開了戶。他非常聰明,是個性情中人。他就靠炒股賺錢,所以會有人喜歡跟他交流要他提供建議。他從來都不肯說。如果有人直截了當?shù)貑査麑λ麄兂止傻目捶?,他就會說出他在賽場上最喜歡的那句話:‘在你開賭之前一切都屬未知?!谖覀児境垂?,會先選擇很火的股票買100股,如果能上漲百分之一,他會繼續(xù)買100股,接著漲的話還繼續(xù)買。他經(jīng)常說,自己玩這個游戲,不是為了把錢送給別人,所以他總會把止損單放在最后交易的那筆單子的價格以下1個點的地方。股價如果漲了他就繼續(xù),有個百分之一的回調(diào),他就立刻平倉。他說如果賠到1個點以上,就是個大傻帽,不管賠的錢是原來保證金里面的還是浮動利潤里面的,都一樣。
“你懂的,專業(yè)賭徒對長線沒多少興趣,只想著賺點穩(wěn)當?shù)腻X。當然了,如果長線能做好,那也是不錯的。帕特炒股從來不聽信內(nèi)幕消息,也不想著在一星期賺20點。他只想著能賺點讓他過得不錯的小錢。我在華爾街碰到過很多人,有成千上萬的外行,而只有帕特一個人把投機炒股當作機會游戲,像輪盤賭博一樣,可他的下注方式很實用。
“帕特·赫恩去世以后,一個經(jīng)常和帕特一起玩的人,用帕特的辦法在拉卡萬納賺了十幾萬后就去做其他股票了。他覺得賺了很多了,不用再用帕特的方式玩了。當股價回調(diào)的時候,他沒有止損,而是任由它發(fā)展,讓虧損像利潤一樣持續(xù)擴大。最后當然是虧了個血本無歸,還倒欠了幾千塊。
“他硬撐了兩三年,賠錢后還一直很狂熱。但是只要他自制,我們也不反對他待在股市里。我記得他坦白承認過,沒一直按照帕特的方式交易是一個很笨的決定。忽然有一天,他來找我,顯得很激動,求我借他一些股票,他要賣掉。過去他一直是個不錯的客戶,是個好小伙兒,所以我愿意替他的賬戶擔保,讓他放空100股。
“他放空了100股湖岸公司的股票,這是在1875年,是比爾·特瑞威爾斯正壓制股市的那個階段。我的這個叫羅伯斯的朋友,在點位正好時賣掉股票,股市下跌的過程中,他一直在賣,正如他之前遵守帕特的交易原則時常做的那樣,很成功。
“嗯,羅伯斯一連四天加碼拋售,賬面上就有了1.5萬美元的利潤。我看到他沒有設(shè)止損單,就提醒了他,他告訴我大跌還沒開始,他不想被一點兒反彈干掉。這個時候是8月,到了9月中旬的時候,他居然到了跟我借10美元,為他的第四個孩子買輛兒童車的地步。他沒有一直用被證實過很有效的辦法去投機,這也是很多人的問題?!崩舷壬鷵u著頭發(fā)表了長篇大論。
他說得沒錯,我有時候感覺投機是個很不自然的工作,因為我覺得很多投機玩家都傾向于做違背本性的決定。誰都有弱點,這對投機來說是很嚴重的問題,而這些弱點在人們做其他事情時經(jīng)常會被防范住,不像在炒股時這么危險。
投機商最大的敵人是自己的內(nèi)心。人性與希望和恐懼密不可分。在炒股時,當市場不利于你時,你無時無刻不在祈求這是最后一天,可你賠了的總是多于你想象的;當市場對你有利時,你又恐懼了,你怕第二天就會失去利潤,所以會趕緊抽身,可這太早了。害怕使你不敢賺本應(yīng)該賺的那些錢。成功者必須要一直與這兩種扎牢在內(nèi)心的本能做斗爭,必須打敗本能的沖動。當充滿希望的時候,他該有所敬畏;當害怕的時候,他該滿懷希望。他必須害怕小虧損會變成大虧損,希望小利潤變成大利潤。像普通人那樣在股票上賭博,絕對是錯誤的。
我從14歲開始投機,這是我做過的唯一一件事,我知道我在說什么。我有30年的交易經(jīng)歷,能賺幾美元的小小交易我干過,幾百萬的巨大交易我也玩過,我得出了這樣的結(jié)論:人在一段時間里可以戰(zhàn)勝某只股票,可沒有一個人能夠戰(zhàn)勝股市。人可能從棉花和谷物期貨市場上賺錢,但沒人能打敗整個期貨市場。就像賭馬一樣,人可能會贏一場比賽,但不可能戰(zhàn)勝這種游戲。
如果我知道怎么讓這個結(jié)論更具說服力和影響力,我必定會去做。若有人不同意,也沒什么關(guān)系,我自己知道這些結(jié)論是完全正確的,不容置疑的。
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